Causes of financial distress: Evidence from PN4 investigative audit findings by Sawandi, Norfaiezah et al.
CAUSES OF FINANCIAL DISTRESS: EVIDENCE FROM PN4 
INVESTIGATIVE AUDIT FINDINGS 
NORFAIEZAH SAWANDI 
ADURA AHMAD 
RAM AL JAFFRI SAAD 
FACULTY OF ACCOUNTANCY 
UNIVERSITI UTARA MALAYSIA 
ABSTRACT 
This study emphasizes on 37 PN4 companies that has announced and submitted 
investigative audit report to the Securities Commission on causes of financial distress. 
This setting has been chosen as it provides direct evidence on the possible causes of 
financial distress. An analysis carried out on the sample reveals four primary financial 
factors that were contributory to financial distress in public listed companies. 
The major factors are debt (doubtful debt and higher bad debt), investment (loss on 
investment, loss on disconsolation and write-down / diminution value in investment, 
property, plant and equipment (PPE) (impairment and write-off) and finance cost (interest 
cost). In respect of non-financial factors, there are six main factors have been identified; 
fraud, non-compliance and potential breaches, incomplete record, related party 
transaction, lack of due diligence, poor internal control and product failure. In summary 
results indicate that the contributory factor to financial distress is the Asian financial 
crisis that affected Malaysia in 1997. The main issues that arose from this crisis were 
weaknesses in the corporate system, the internal control system and corporate governance 
process. 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
A common view amongst public is that business entities are incorporated for the sole 
purpose of profit taking and the belief that the entity is sustainable indefinitely in the 
future. Unfortunately not every business will be as fortunate as planned. One of the most 
significant threats of many businesses today, despite their size and the nature is 
insolvency (Neophytou et al., 2000). Purnanandam (2004) assumed that apart from the 
solvent and the insolvent states, a firm faces an intermediate state called financial 
distress. He defined financial distress as a low cash-flow state of the firm in which it 
incurs deadweight losses without being insolvent. He again explained that a firm is in 
financial distress if the asset value falls below some lower threshold during its life. 
Meanwhile, Bergstrom and Sundgren (2002) explained financial distress as the condition 
where the company is basically viable but has run into financial difficulties for solely 
financial reasons. There is evidence showing that the market value of the distressed firms 
declined substantially (Warner, 1997). Thus, the supplier of the capital, investors and 
creditors, as well as the management and employees were severely affected from 
business failures (Neophytou et al., 2000). Corporate failures have adverse spill over 
effects on the nation's economic growth and its business community (Muhammad Sori et 
al. (2002). Thus, the failures jeopardize the performance of financial institutions and 
undermine the government efforts to promote economic development. 
Neophytou et al. (2000) pointed out in their study that prior research on business failure 
in US, UK, Canada and Australia found that small, private and newly-founded companies 
with ineffective control procedures and poor cash flow planning are more vulnerable to 
financial distress. Meanwhile, Shukla (1994) stated that while the determining principles 
of corporate success are more or less similar in all cases, the paths to failure are different 
and varied. Mostly, when organizations fail (i.e. go bankrupt, lose market share, etc.) one 
tends to assign an external events for instance a long-drawn labour strike and a bad 
investment as the root cause (Shukla, 1994). 
This study focuses on the 37 companies that have announced and submitted the 
investigative audit report to the Securities Commission for investigating the on going 
causes of financial distress. This setting was chosen because it provides direct evidence 
on possible causes of financial distress. Prior studies such as Che Haat et al. (2005), 
Abdullah (2004), Karbhari and Muhammad Sori (2004), Che Haat et al. (2003), 
Muhamad Sori et al. (2002), Fatimah (2001) and Mohamad et al. (2001) either predict the 
likelihood of financial distress or investigate the corporate governance characteristics 
based on sample of healthy and non-healthy companies. In contrast, our study extends 
the existing literature on causes of financial distress by identifying the possible causes ef 
using a unique data set. This unique data set is the audit findings disclosed by the 
investigative auditor whom are required by the Securities Commission to conduct an 
investigation on pass losses incurred by the companies and take necessary steps to 
recover the losses. As such, the evidence presented on causes of financial distress is more 
credible. 
1.2 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
The Asian crisis in 1996-1997 caused large economic shocks within the region 
(Bergstrom and Sundgren, 2002) and one of the countries which were affected is 
Malaysia. One of the obvious effects was distressed-financial state experienced by the 
business society, and some of companies listed on Bursa Malaysia (formerly known as 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange). Those business sectors worst h t  were the broad 
property sector, share financing, insurance, business services and manufacturing 
(Fatimah, 2001). In Malaysia, firms are considered a failure when they apply to the court 
or relevant authorities for a restructuring or reorganization scheme based on a scheme of 
arrangement pursuant to Section 176 of the Malaysian Companies Act 1965 (Muhamad 
Sori et al., 2002). 
Fatimah (2001) claimed that as at November 2000 nearly half of the companies on the 
Bursa Malaysia were in financial trouble and was threatened with collapse. In order to 
protect the investors, Bursa Malaysia has issued Practice Note No.4 (PN4) which is 
effective on 15 February 2001 to govern and overcome the problem of financially distress 
companies. 
Bursa Malaysia has introduced a new sector for listed company that fulfills one or more 
of the criteria set out under paragraph 2.0 of PN4. Among the criteria used are deficit in 
company's adjusted shareholders' equity on a consolidated basis and the appointment of 
receiver and1 or manager over the property on the company or its major subsidiary or 
major associated company. As at 31St October 2001 there were 95 companies classified 
under KLSE PN4 sector (http://www.klse.com/m~/website/listin~. However, 
SC had imposed the investigative audit on 40 out of 95 companies since October 2002 as 
part of the requirements to have their restructuring plans approved. 
2.0 RESEARCH QUESTION 
Research question to address the objectives is what are the probable causes of financial 
distress among public listed companies in Malaysia that have been required to conduct 
investigative audit? 
3.0 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY 
Thus with all that in mind and by using a unique data set which is publicly available 
recently on selected PN4 companies, (PN4 companies required to conduct investigative 
audit) the objectives of this study is to identify and classify the causes (financial and non- 
financial reasons) leading some Malaysian public listed companies into financially 
distressed condition. 
4.0 MOTIVATION OF THE STUDY 
Companies have different reasons for seeking to be listed on the Bursa Malaysia but the 
primary reason is to raise capital. Other advantages of getting listed are to have a higher 
profile and gain investors' confidence. Investors tend to have greater confidence in public 
listed companies as the company would have to first fulfill the stringent listing 
requirements of Bursa Malaysia before admitted to either Main Board or Second Board 
(http://www.bursamalaysia.com/website/education/smb~reasonslisted.htm). 
However there are a number of public listed companies which have encountered 
distressed-financial state and this may adversely affect the stakeholders. In order to 
protect the investor, Bursa Malaysia has issued Practice Note No.4. Warner (1997) as 
cited by Neophytou et al. (2000) stated that evidence shows that the market value of the 
distressed firms declined substantially. Thus, the supplier of the capital, investors and 
creditors, as well as the management and employees are severely affected from business 
failures (Neophytou et al., 2000). 
Fatimah (2001) claimed that even the substantial enterprises can be threatened with 
collapse, and give disastrous consequences to their stakeholders. She further argued that a 
real consequence is that members of the public who invested in shares in the Bursa 
Malaysia companies, which have been suspended from trading because of the financial 
distress of such firms, cannot sell their shares. This means that they have been locked in 
for an inordinate period of time. 
Meanwhile, Shukla (1994) argued that the study that addresses the issue of corporate 
failure is by exception. He again argued that while corporate failure is an age-old reality, 
its study is a comparatively recent phenomenon. Furthermore Muhamad Sori et al. (2002) 
stated that corporate failures have adversely spill over effects on the nation's economic 
growth and its business community. They further argued that failures jeopardize the 
performance of financial institutions and undermine the government efforts to promote 
economic development. 
Given the adverse effects of financial distress on the various affected parties, the causes 
of financial distress need to be identified. We hope to shed some lights on the factors that 
lead companies to financial distress based on a unique secondary data namely 
investigative audit findings. The study aims to provide insight (lesson) that could be used 
to avoid or minimize the incident of financial distress especially among public listed 
companies and Malaysian companies generally in the future. 
5.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
A review of previous studies reveals and show that there are various reasons contributing 
companies to financial distress state. Several studies focused on methods or ways in of 
resolving financial distress (Turesky, 2003; Kahl, 2002; Franks and Sussman, 2000). 
Kahl (2002) found that only about one third (113) of the financially distressed firms 
survived were individual companies. Meanwhile, Turesky found that the factors that 
influencing the takeover of a distressed firm were sales generating ability, market risk 
and management efficiency. 
A few researches had been conducted to identify causes that contributed to companies 
experiencing distressed-financial state. Shukla (1994) identified several causes from 
management perspectives that lead to business failure, m life-cycle decline, trapped by 
past success, inappropriate strategic biases and 'mental model' and rigidity in response to 
crisis. 
Neophytou et al. (2000) stated that the factors that lead business to fail varies. Among the 
reasons were increasing interest rate, recession squeezed profits and heavy debt burden. 
Furthermore, they explained that industry-specific characteristics, such as government 
regulation and the nature of operations could contribute to a firm's financial distress. 
Meanwhile, Whitaker (1999) argued that more firms enter financial distress as a result of 
poor management than as a result of economic distress. He defined economic distress as a 
decline in industry operating income and poor management as a negative trend line of 
firm operating income or industry operating income measured over a five-year time 
period. He found that seventy-seven percent of the firms were poorly managed, reporting 
a trend of decline relative to their industries and forty-seven percent of the sample firms 
were in economically distressed industry upon entry into financial distress. 
A study done by Denis and Denis (1995) which focus on firms undergo leveraged 
recapitalization report that thirty-one percent of the firms completing leveraged 
recapitalization between 1985 and 1988 subsequently encounter financial distress. They 
argued that the incidence of distress is not related to several characteristics that have 
previously been linked with poorly-structured deals. Thus, they attribute the high rate of 
distress primarily to unexpected macroeconomic and regulatory developments. 
In Malaysian context, there are a few studies that have been done regarding corporate 
failure or financial distress (Che Haat et al., 2005; Abdullah, 2004; Karbhari and 
Muhammad Sori, 2004; Che Haat et al., 2003; Muharnad Sori et al., 2002; Fatimah, 2001; 
Mohamad et al., 2001). Fatimah in her paper on corporate disasters in general explained 
that the financial troubles faced by a number of firms in Malaysia were attributed to 
many factors but the primary reason was due to ef poor corporate governance and 
inadequate internal control process. She classified the factors into organizational issues 
(e.g. poor standards of ethics and integrity and excessive concentration of authority), 
policy issues (e.g. poor investment criteria and poor focus on core business), supervisory 
issues (e.g. poor credit management) and review and appraisal matter. 
Mohamad et al. (2001) conducted a study to identify the general characteristics of failure 
of firms listed on the Bursa Malaysia. Attributes that was under scrutiny were the age of 
the firm, the auditor's reports, the trend in selected financial ratios to ascertain 
profitability, cash flow, liquidity and leverage performance of firms. The findings suggest 
no clear pattern for identification of failures, except for trends in financial ratio. 
Muhamad Sori et al. (2002) discussed the findings on identification of potential failures 
based on accounting and market information attributes. In their study a prediction model 
for business success and failure which unique to Malaysian business were successfully 
developed. Several attributes such as the age of the firm and the auditor's report have 
been analyzed for identification of potential failures. 
Chai (2002) in his paper stated that corporate collapse could be attributable to factors 
such as mismanagement, colossal management and corporate fraud, severe lack of or no 
corporate governance, disregard of business and corporate practices and severe lack of 
corporate accountability. 
A special report by Alias (2004) regarding the role of professional adviser, classifies the 
reasons of corporate failures into three categories which are business failure, governance 
failure and reporting failure. 
Meanwhile the study done by Abdullah (2004) examines the influence of board 
independence, CEO duality and ownership structure on the firm financial distressed 
status using a sample of distressed and healthy companies listed on the Bursa Malaysia. 
The study found that board independence and CEO duality were not associated with 
financial distressed status. On contrary, the findings on ownership structure show that 
management and non-executive directors' interest are associated negatively with 
financial distress. 
In addition, a study done by Che Haat et al. (2005) focus on exploring the governing 
characteristics of financially distress companies by comparing three (3) groups of 
companies, namely PN4 companies, positive economic profit companies and negative 
profit companies . They found that relative to both control groups, PN4 companies had 
high insider ownership, borrowing and low equity value. 
Meanwhile in another study, Che Haat et al, (2003) examines the corporate governance 
practices of twelve PN4 listed companies that have had restructuring plans approved by 
the regulators before and after the restructuring had taken place. The study found that 
board size, the number of non-executives directors on the board and the number of non- 
executive directors on the audit committee were correlated with either the level of 
transparency or the amount of disclosures. Additionally, the study found that regulators 
may have overlooked the opportunity on insisting good corporate governance practices 
when approving their restructuring plans. 
Karbhari and Muhammad Sori (2004) in their study have developed a model that predicts 
corporate financial distress which could be applied in tracing the potential failure of 
Malaysian financially distressed firms. Their findings suggest that the models are reliable 
and have good practical use for making decision in real markets which can predicts as far 
as five (5) years before the actual distress. In addition, five (5) financial ratios were 
found significant to discriminate between distress and non-distress firms; there are total 
liabilities to total assets, asset turnover, inventory to total assets, sales to inventory and 
cash to total assets. 
To our knowledge, within the Malaysian context, there is no study which has been 
conducted to identify and classify the causes contributory to financial distress condition 
faced by public listed companies using a unique data set of PN4 companies whom have 
reported investigative audit report to SC. This research fills the gap. 
6.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
6.1 DATA SET/ SAMPLE SELECTION 
The selection of the sample was based on the list of companies in the Bursa Malaysia 
PN4 sector that are required to conduct investigative audit. Investigative auditing has 
been imposed by the SC on financially distressed firms before any restructuring or 
reorganization scheme can be approved in the hope that the company will be able to look 
at the weaknesses that led to it's present state (New Strait Times, 1 Aug 2003). They have 
to submit an investigative audit report to SC within the time period given and announce 
through Bursa Malaysia's website a summary of the investigative audit findings to the 
public. 
Quality investigative audit reports should effectively identify the causes that lead 
companies to their distressed financial state and serve as a basis for further action by the 
company to cover their loses (Tan Sri Ali Abd. Kadir, NST, 1 Aug 2003). The SC had 
imposed investigative audits on 40 companies since October 2002 as part of the 
requirements to have their restructuring plans approved. Non compliance of this 
requirement will breach Section 32(6) of Security Act 1993. 
As at 31st August 2004, 38 companies have announced that the investigative audit is 
already completed and the full reports were already submitted to the SC. However, only 
37 investigative audit summaries have been made available on the website of Bursa 
Malaysia. Thus the sample of this study is based upon 37 investigative audit findings. 
6.2 FINANCIAL FACTOR 
A thorough study had been carried out on 37 investigative audit summaries, a detailed 
scrutiny was done by classifying and identifying the financial factors, a total of 25 reports 
could be used for the reason of our analyses. The remaining balance of the investigative 
audit summaries could not be used due to insufficient financial information. For the 
purpose of this study companies with the percentage of losses accounted for over the total 
accumulated losses equal or higher than 80 percent will be taken into consideration. 
However there are two opaque investigative audit summaries which could not be 
analyzed as the figure given is in percentage or amount of losses are not stated. The 
companies are MBF Capital Berhad and Bridgecon Holding Berhad. 
6.3 NON FINANCIAL FACTOR 
A similar methodology was applied in order to identify the non-financial factors. A 
thorough study of the 37 investigative audit summaries had been done by scrutinizing 
line by line each of the summaries to find out in order to analyze the non-financial factors 
that have been reported. All the 37 investigative audit summaries could be used to 
identify and classify the non-financial factors. 
6.4 METHODOLOGY 
As this study is exploratory in nature, a simplistic method has been adopted to identify 
and classify the factors associated with financial distress among Malaysian public listed 
companies. A descriptive analysis has been carried out by reading the investigative audit 
summary to identify and classify the factors. 
The work done indicated that the factors could be classified into two broad categories that 
are financial and non-financial factor. The financial factors are coded as F (F1, F2, F3 
. . .Fn), while non financial factors are coded as NF WFl, NF2, NF3 . . .NFn). For example, 
if the cause is due to high debt burden (overleveraged) researcher coded F1 and if due to 
poor internal control researcher coded NFl. These two broad categories have been 
narrowed down to several sub-categories that have been identified as the study proceeds. 
The researchers coded the information in the database worksheet in Microsoft Excel. In 
order to ensure internal consistency and accuracy, cross-check has been done by the other 
team member. When the data entry was completed, the mathematical abilities of the 
package have been employed to generate sum of each factors in term of number of 
occurrence and total amount in Ringgit Malaysia (RM). 
In respect of financial factors, the companies were selected on the basis of percentage of 
accounted losses (as reported in the summary) over its accumulated losses for the 
relevant periods. In cases where the accumulated losses were not stated in the summary, 
the researchers obtained the figures from the KLSE-RIS website. In order to ensure data 
consistency and accuracy, accumulated losses taken from KLSE-RIS is based on the 
basis of the accounted losses in the investigative audit summary. For instance if the 
companies accounted losses reported are before tax, thus the accumulated losses taken 
are also before tax figure. For the purposes of this study only companies with 80% ' and 
higher in term of percentage of accounted losses over its accumulated losses were taken 
into account. In terms of classification of financial factors, factors that have occurred for 
two (2) times and less are categorized under other factors. Factors occurring than two (2) 
times are classified as a separate or stand-alone factor. 
Meanwhile for non-financial factors, only clearly stated factors in the investigative audit 
summaries were taken into account in order to identify and classify it accurately. 
Examples of the statement detailing each of the non-financial factors identified will be 
given when discussing the result. Some of the factors identified are fraud, non- 
compliance and potential breaches. In this study, all the potential breaches are included 
despite financial losses incurred requiring confirmation through legal opinion and 
interpretation. The details of the sub categories of both factors and other findings will be 
discussed in the following section. 
7.0 RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
7.1 INVESTIGATIVE AUDITOR AND EXTERNAL AUDITOR 
Table 1 shows the list of the investigative auditor and the external auditor for each 
companies under investigated. The investigative auditor is appointed by the company but 
imposed by the SC to conduct the investigate audit. The external auditors listed down are 
auditors during the periods under investigation by the investigative auditor. However, 
there were two (2) companies which did not disclose the investigative auditor in the 
investigative audit summary, namely Fountain View and Penas Corporation 








non-big four. The survey found that most companies under PN4 hire external auditors 
from big four companies which contributes to 62.2 percent of the total sample. Whilst, in 
respect of the investigative auditors, non-big four firms represents 8 1.1 percent of the 
total sample. 
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From the above findings, there is one possible factor that points to the hiring of non big 
four firms as investigative auditors, which is cost. As these companies are already in 
financial difficulty, hiring big-four auditor may lead them to a worsened situation as the 
fee charged by them is higher compared to non-big four. 
7.2 FINANCIAL FACTOR 
Table 2 shows the results of the descriptive statistic analysis. Total losses incurred by the 
25 companies during the period under audit were RM8.62 billion of which 96 percent 
were accounted for. Average losses incurred by the companies during the period under 
audit investigation were RM345 million. The period under audit varies among the 
companies from minimum of three (3) years up to thirteen (13) years. There are two (2) 
companies with 3, 4 and 6 years of financial periods, eighteen (18) companies with 5 
years of financial periods and only one (1) company with 13 years of financial periods. 
w 
Average losses for companies with three (3) years audit period is RM 156 million, and 
this amount increases as the audit periods increase except for category under thirteen (13) 
years of audit period where the average losses is only RM 69 million. The company is 
Integrated Rubber Corporation Berhad (IRCB) which was formerly known as Berjuntai 
Tin. The financial accounting year under audit is from 1991 until 2003. 









Table 3 indicates the categories of financial factors. As can be read from the table, there 
are eleven (1 1) sub-financial factors which lead the respective public listed companies 
into financially distressed condition. The factors have been ranked according to amount 
of losses. The top four (4) major financial factors are debtor, investment, plant, property 
and equipment (PPE) and finance cost with number of occurrence being more than ten 





The other factors are due to sale, losses, provision for contingency, intangible asset, 
deposit, inventory and others. The four (4) main categories of financial factors identified 
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Table 4 shows the sub-categories of debt factor, which consists of doubtful debt, higher 
bad debt and write-off loan. From the findings RM1,942,476,061 is resulted from 
doubtful debt, which represents 79.1 percent of the total sample, RM369,304,494 is a 
result of higher amount of the bad debt, which contributes, to 14.9 percent of total sample 
, Rh4133,893,616 is a result of loan written off, which amounted to 5.5 percent of the 
total sample and RM12,534,564 is from loss on settlement, which amounts to 0.5 percent 








Factors that are probable in contributing to this phenomenon are as follows: 
During the financial crisis most of the debtors companies were in financial 
difficulty position which increase the probability the debts being uncollected. 
Majority of the doubtful debts, higher bad debt and write-off loan were from the 
delayed and discontinued projects and also advances to the holding and 
subsidiary companies. 
Many of the financial institutions froze the banking facilities previously granted 
to the subsidiary companies where their projects and joint ventures were delayed 
or terminated and could not generate cash flow . 















Table 4. Sub categories of Debtor Factor 
Doubtful debt 
Higher bad debt 
Percentage 
Write-off loan 
Table 5 shows the sub categories of investment factor which consists of loss on 
investment, loss on deconsolidation, diminution, provision for diminution, write-down 
and write-off of investment. From the Table, we can see that 45 percent or 
RM840,869,116 results from loss on investment. It is followed by loss on 
deconsolidation which amounted to 27.6 percent or RM514,415,000 and provision for 






The possible factors that caused such occurrence were due to poor concentration on core 
business. In addition, many companies' management had the intention to change the 
nature of their business from their core business to unrelated area, for example from 
property developer to equipment supplier. Then, they vigorously went into joint ventures 
or investments with overseas parties. As a result, a substantial part of these business 
investments were unsuccessful and resulted in significant losses or write-offs. Some of 
the investments were made after conducting feasibility study and some have no feasibility 
study at all. It was noted that most of the investments made without feasibility study have 
ceased business within 2 years of operations. This indicates that there was a lack of 
proper investment decision making and monitoring by management. 
No. of 
3 
Table 5- Sub categories of Investment Factor 














INV loss on deconsolidation 
INV provision for 
Table 6 provides a summary of the sub categories of the PPE factor that caused losses to 
the companies. As shown in the Table 6, two major factor of PPE are impairment (RM 
707,194,015or 58.0 percent) and write-down 1 write-off (RM 374,562,000 or 30.7 
percent). It may not be too far-fetched to say that these happened due to impairment in 
the value of fixed assets of their subsidiaries. The losses recognized relate to the 
differences between the recoverable values of the assets as compared to the carrying 
value in the books of the subsidiary companies. 
diminution 


















A number of companies have faced the problem, where the operation was suspended due 
to the downturn in the market and the slowdown in their core business sector. After the 
economic crisis in 1997, they planned to reuse the plant but they found it not viable. 
Therefore, impairment loss has to be provided to write down the plant to its net realizable 
value. 
Table 6, Sub categories of Property, Plant & Equipment (PPE: Factor 
1 impairment losses 1 
t PPE write-downloff 
PPE depreciation 





Table 7 shows the sub categories of finance cost factor. Our analysis reveals 14 out of 25 
companies being studied contributes to RM 1,100,369,587 of losses which is generated 
from interest cost. This is due to the increase in interest costs relative to borrowings of 
the companies. Borrowings comprise bankers acceptance, revolving credits, overdrafts, 
fixed loans and hire purchase. The bank borrowings were utilized to fund working capital 
requirements and acquisitions of shareholdings in other companies. Besides that, 
company with high level of borrowings has to suffer a higher interest expenses as a result 




PPE lost on acquisition 
Total 
Table 7, Finance Cost Factor 
Sub-factors 1 No. of co. 1 RM 1 Percentage 1 







1 ( 1,000,000 
29 1 1,218,539,892 








Table 8 shows the categories of non-financial factors which lead public listed companies 
into financial distress situation. There are six (6) factors that have been identified; fraud 
and non compliance, incomplete record, lack of due diligence, poor internal control, 
related party transaction and product failure. These factors have been ranked according to 
the number of occurrence. The first three (3) major non financial factors are fraud and 
non compliance, incomplete record and related party transaction with the number of 






Table 8. Categories of Non Financial Factors 
Sub-factors No. of occurrence 1 
( Incomplete record 13 
Fraud / Non-com~liance/ Potential breaches 
Lack of due diligence 12 
(n = 37) 
20 
To explain each of the non financial factors, an extract of the statement from the 
investigative audit summary has been chosen. The best examples are as follows: 
1. Fraud/Non-compliance/Potential Breaches 
1. Techno Asia Berhad 
"Intention to deceive, make or furnish or knowingly and willfully authorize or 
permit the making or furnishing of false or misleading statement. " 
Party(ies) responsible-BOD and management. 
. . (Investigative Audit Summary-page 2) 
11. Woo Hing Brothers (Malaya) Berhad (WHB) 
"There were non-compliance of Section 114 of then Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange @USE) Listing Requirements in respect of the announcement made 
by the (JKYB) on 16 September 1996 and breaches of Section 169 (i) of the 
Companies Act 1965 with regards to the preparation of the financial 
statements ofJVC for theJinancial period ended 31 December 1997. " 
(Investigative Audit Summary-page 1) 
1 Poor internal control 
1 Product failure 
2. Incomplete record 
1. Techno Asia Berhad 
"Accounting and other records were notproperly maintained. " 
Party (ies) responsible-BOD and management 




11. Woo Hing Brothers (Malaya) Berhad (WHB) 
"There was insuficient documentary evidence to ascertain whether the 
directors of W B  had taken any actions or measures to recover the debts 
underlying the provisions made. " 
(Investigative Audit Summary-page 3) 
3. Related party transaction 
i. NCK Corporation BHD 
"Transaction with related party which resulted in material losses 
(RM6.3million) during the relevant period-advances made with no 
commercial justiJication. Company involved-NCK's subsidiary ". 
(Investigative Audit Summary-page 3) 
4. Lack of due diligence 
1. NCK Corporation BHD 
"Disposal of subsidiary without exercising reasonable diligence. " 
Party (ies) responsible-NCK board and management 
(Investigative Audit Summary-page 3) 
. . 
11. Techno Asia Berhad 
"Entering into material transactions without exercising reasonable 
diligence. " 
Party(ies) responsible-BOD and management 
(Investigative Audit Summary-page 2) 
5. Poor internal control 
1. Kelana Industries Berhad 
"Poor internal controls related to share trading. " 
. . (Investigative Audit Summary-page 1) 
11. Woo Hing Brothers (Malaya) Berhad (WHB) 
"A review of the operational manual indicated inadequate credit control 
9 ,  procedures. 
(Investigative Audit Summary-page 3) 
6. Product failure 
i. AWC Facility Solutions Berhad (Trans Capital Holdings Berhad) 
' Y s  a result of the decrease in sales of PCBA, TCHB Group invested in a new 
product, namely ORBTM 2.2GB disk. Due to technical issues involved during the 
production process, the product did not take off as it was intended, thus causing 
further deterioration in revenue of the group. " 
(Investigative Audit Summary-page 2) 
8.0 CONCLUSION 
The main objective of this study is to identify and classify the causes (financial and non- 
financial reason) that lead some of the Malaysian public listed companies into financially 
distressed condition. In order to achieve the above objective, this study had selected 37 
out of 38 companies as a sample. The companies were chosen based on the list of 
companies in the Bursa Malaysia PN4 sector that are required to conduct investigation 
audit. 
Based on the sample of companies studied, it shows that there are four major financial 
factors which were causes of financial distress in public listed companies. The top major 
factors are debt (doubtful debt and higher bad debt), investment (loss on investment, loss 
on disconsolation and write-down / diminution value in investment, PPE (impairment and 
write-off) and finance cost (interest cost). Nonetheless, in respect of non-financial factors, 
there are six main factors that have been identified such as fraud, non-compliance and 
potential breaches, incomplete record, related party transaction, lack of due diligence, 
poor internal control and product failure. 
From the results, it may not be too far-fetched to say that this finding is the same as that 
found by Fatimah (2001) in her study on selected Malaysian public listed companies with 
financial troubles. A possible explanation is that the latter found that for such situations 
to occur there would have been many control weaknesses or failures which went 
uncorrected. The most significant weaknesses are organizational issues such as poor 
standards of ethics and integrity, policy issues such as poor focus on key markets and 
poor investment criteria, and review and appraisal issues such as the inability to detect 
and correct other control failings within sufficient time. 
In summary, results indicate that the main factor that caused companies to experience 
financial distress is the Asian financial crisis that affected Malaysia in 1997. The main 
issues that arose from this crisis were weaknesses in the corporate system, the internal 
control system and corporate governance process. These problems as a whole was 
primarily responsible in placing companies in a threatening position of high level debt, 
loss on investment, collapse, and disasters with consequences to the stakeholders (the 
shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, bankers and society). 
8.1 LIMITATIONS 
This study is subject to several limitations. As pointed out earlier, although the 
companies that are required by SC to perform investigative audit is 40 companies but 
only 37 investigative audit summaries are available as at 31 August 2004 for analysis. 
However, due to incomplete data, only 25 out of 37 companies were analyzed to identify 
the financial factors. Thus, this study lacks external validity since the results could not be 
generalized to those companies whom have not published their investigative audit reports 
and those whom published the report but only explained less than 80% of the total losses 
incurred. 
8.2 AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Perhaps for future research, it is also interesting to study on the action taken by the 
companies after the investigative audit has been completed especially those companies 
encountering fraud, non-compliance and potential breaches. Another area that can be 
explored is the characteristic of corporate governance for those company encountering 
fi-aud and those not encountering fraud. 
All in all, there is much more that could be discovered on the factors that cause 
companies to experience financial distress, though the present study provides a picture of 
the primary factors that cause companies to face financial trouble, more conclusive 
evidence can only be made after further study is conducted. 
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